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NO. 46 OCTOBER 2020 Introduction 
The New EU Migration and Asylum 
Package: Breakthrough or Admission 
of Defeat? 
Steffen Angenendt, Nadine Biehler, Raphael Bossong, David Kipp and Anne Koch 
On 23 September 2020, the European Commission presented its long-awaited draft 
of a new migration and asylum package to overcome the protracted blockade in this 
policy area. Central elements are the planned preliminary examinations of asylum 
applications at the external borders of the European Union (EU) and a new division of 
labour among the member states, which in the future will have the choice between 
accepting asylum seekers and returning those who have been rejected. The risk of 
human rights violations inherent in these suggestions is immense. However, since this 
also applies to the status quo – as the situation on the Greek islands shows – the pros 
and cons of the reform proposal must be carefully weighed up. Support for the reform 
package can only be justified if the combination of restrictive and protection-oriented 
elements, as intended by the Commission, is maintained in the intergovernmental 
negotiations. 
 
Since the large-scale arrival of refugees in 
2015, the fronts in the EU have hardened: 
The asylum systems of the countries on the 
EU’s external southern borders – especially 
Greece’s – are chronically overburdened; 
governments are therefore calling for a 
solidarity-based distribution of new arrivals 
in the EU. In contrast, the four Eastern 
European Visegrad states and Austria cat-
egorically reject any obligatory distribution 
of asylum seekers or recognised refugees. 
The governments of the other EU member 
states are under domestic political pressure 
and are therefore insisting on a pan-Euro-
pean distribution in order to achieve a long-
term, sustainable solution. The devastating 
consequences of this blockade are well 
known: In 2020 there was a temporary sus-
pension of the Greek asylum law, illegal 
pushbacks of migrants on the open seas 
and such a drastic undercutting of humani-
tarian standards in Greek reception camps 
that the fire in Moria seemed like an un-
avoidable consequence. 
The Commission now seeks to break out 
of this dysfunctional situation with a great 
leap forward. Its reform proposal comprises 
an extensive, complex bundle of communi-
cations and legislative proposals that re-
flects the effort to take into account widely 
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divergent positions. The Commission paints 
a picture of a three-storied house, in which 
more extensive cooperation with third 
countries and stronger EU external border 
security should reduce the volume of asy-
lum applications, and thus facilitate a solu-
tion to the most difficult issue to date: the 
distribution of asylum seekers and recog-
nised refugees within the EU. Politically 
central is a new balancing of interests that 
aims to bring together what is supposedly 
incompatible: The goal is a common 
mechanism for all member states that pro-
vides relief for the countries initially re-
ceiving asylum seekers while also guaran-
teeing that the Visegrad states do not have 
to accept refugees from other EU member 
states. The key to this is reinterpreting the 
repatriation of rejected asylum seekers and 
irregular migrants as an act of European 
solidarity. All details of the comprehensive 
reform package are subordinated to the 
overarching goal of reducing the number of 
asylum applications already at the external 
borders, and of shaping the management 
of the remaining volume in such a way that 
every government within the EU can 
reconcile its contribution with its central 
political convictions. 
The core elements of this approach are 
(1) the preliminary examination of asylum 
applications at the EU’s external borders, 
(2) the introduction of a multilevel solidar-
ity mechanism that takes into account 
different levels of pressure and (3) the 
Europeanisation of return, including the 
development of a complex institutional 
infrastructure. 
Preliminary Examination and 
Acceleration of Asylum Appli-
cations 
The European Commission wants to avoid 
conditions like those in the Moria camp 
by massively accelerating all procedures. All 
asylum seekers and irregular migrants are 
to be registered and medically examined 
within five days, according to a newly pro-
posed “screening” regulation. In addition, 
the identification of those arriving at the 
external borders is to be improved by 
expanding European databases (especially 
EURODAC). At the same time, there is a 
plan to presort promising from less prom-
ising asylum applications. For asylum seek-
ers from countries of origin whose asylum 
recognition rates are below 20 per cent, 
accelerated procedures are to be obligatory 
and completed within a maximum of 12 
weeks. Until then, entry will be refused, 
which should lead to a prompt deportation 
within an additional 12 weeks in the event 
of rejection. 
The Commission leaves it up to the mem-
ber states to decide whether asylum seekers 
are to be held in detention centres during 
screening, accelerated asylum procedures 
and before repatriation. This can result in 
detention periods of up to six months. 
Therefore, there is a justified concern that – 
as is currently the case on the Greek is-
lands – large new long-term camps could 
emerge, with all the known challenges 
concerning the protection of residents’ or 
detainees’ human rights. In addition, there 
are strong doubts as to whether rule-of-law 
principles can be guaranteed during accel-
erated border procedures, such as the right 
to lodge effective appeals against asylum 
decisions. At the very least, however, the 
Commission is proposing an independent 
“monitoring mechanism” as an element 
of the screening regulation to monitor 
compliance with human rights in the re-
spective member states that apply these 
procedures. In addition, particularly vulner-
able persons, such as unaccompanied 
minors, should generally be excluded from 
the procedure. 
New Distribution Mechanism 
The Dublin Regulation, which has been 
controversial and dysfunctional for years 
and regulates responsibility for asylum 
procedures, is to be abolished. In its place, 
a new comprehensive regulation on asylum 
and migration management should not 
only regulate responsibility for asylum 
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procedures, but also provide for a new 
solidarity mechanism. 
As before, the states at the EU’s external 
borders are to be primarily responsible for 
processing asylum applications, as was 
already the case under the Dublin Regula-
tion. Time limits that define the responsi-
bilities of the respective states are to be 
prolonged, and the definition of “family 
affiliation” – according to which a country 
other than the country of first arrival is 
already responsible – is now to be ex-
tended to include siblings. 
The new Commission proposal is essen-
tially aiming at a complex system of burden-
sharing, in which the member states can, 
or must, participate in different ways, 
depending on the number of arrivals. For 
“normal situations”, the Commission is 
planning an annual voluntary quota of 
places for intra-European distribution that 
will be reserved primarily for sea rescue 
operations. If individual states of arrival are 
under increased pressure, all other member 
states are obliged to participate by making 
contributions that are calculated according 
to an EU-wide distribution key taking into 
account the size of the population and 
the gross domestic product of the countries, 
although certain exceptions to this quota 
are permitted. Those who do not take in 
asylum seekers or recognised refugees can 
contribute benefits to support repatriation 
(“return sponsorships”, see below) or other 
in-kind assistance for migration manage-
ment. 
The Commission aims to ensure that the 
required mix of support measures is guar-
anteed by the contributions of all EU mem-
ber states. However, only during the third 
stage of a systemic crisis, such as in 2015, 
would all member states be obliged to 
participate in redistribution or return. Ulti-
mately, it is a political decision to declare 
such a crisis, as was the case with the “Mass 
Influx Directive” (2001/55/EC), which was 
never used and is to be replaced. 
This complex model aims to guarantee 
both “permanent” and “flexible” solidarity. 
However, the assumption that this can be 
implemented in practice and will be sup-
ported by the member states is based solely 
on the hypothesis that all parties involved 
should be interested in a compromise 
because all other approaches to ensure 
regular burden-sharing have failed. 
Europeanisation of Return 
Since the start of the Covid-19 crisis, and in 
view of recent events in Moria, the willing-
ness of many EU member states to commit 
themselves to taking in refugees from states 
at the EU’s external borders has again di-
minished. This also explains why “return 
sponsorships” are to be introduced as a new 
instrument. With this, member states shall 
commit themselves to taking responsibility 
for specific persons who have received 
legally valid return orders in overburdened 
states of first arrival. If states decide to 
contribute in this way, they will assume 
responsibility for coordination with the 
countries of origin. 
In this context, the member states are 
called upon to use their bilateral influence 
to persuade third countries to conclude 
agreements on improved readmission 
cooperation with all EU member states. 
This would also enable measures that fall 
within national competence. In addition, 
the European Commission intends to 
appoint a “Return Coordinator”. If the re-
patriation of a person without the right to 
residency does not succeed within eight 
months (six months in crisis situations), the 
“sponsoring” member state is obliged to 
take in this person – which ultimately 
amounts to redistribution “through the 
back door”. 
It is unclear how authorities are sup-
posed to deal with persons whose identities 
cannot be determined and what methods 
individual member states will use to per-
suade countries of origin to cooperate with 
the readmission of their nationals. An even 
tougher approach than before could seri-
ously damage the effectiveness, legitimacy 
and sustainability of the EU’s external 
migration policy. 
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The Future of the Reform Package 
After initial critical statements by the 
Visegrad states, the next conference of 
ministers of home affairs on 8 October 2020 
will give a first EU-wide impression of the 
level of political support for the proposed 
reforms. Parallel to the negotiations on the 
package, the Commission is pursuing a 
pilot project that is intended to illustrate 
the advantages of the planned approach 
and dispel doubts about its feasibility: It has 
announced the formation of a task force to 
work with the Greek government to estab-
lish a jointly led reception facility on Lesbos. 
It is to replace the burnt-down camp in 
Moria and ensure the adequate accommo-
dation and registration of asylum seekers. 
It remains doubtful whether this will be 
enough to win the support of the member 
states for a comprehensive reform. There is 
a great danger that they will only agree to 
restrictive measures, as in the past. In this 
case, the EU’s lowest common denominator 
approach would boil down to the further 
tightening of external border controls and 
an additional reduction in irregular migra-
tion. This would cement the status quo. 
At best, a small coalition of “willing” mem-
ber states would, as before, endeavour in 
a mini-lateral or bilateral framework to 
alleviate the humanitarian catastrophe on 
the Greek islands, the mainland and in the 
numerous other camps along the Balkan 
route, and to provide appropriate support 
to the host countries outside the EU, espe-
cially Turkey. This would place a huge 
burden on Germany in particular. 
The potential added value of the Com-
mission’s proposal lies in its design as a 
package deal in which restrictive and 
protection-oriented elements are linked. 
This leads to an immensely complex nego-
tiation process, which is just as monu-
mental a political and institutional task 
as the implementation of the planned 
measures. Ultimately, however, this is cur-
rently the only hope for substantial pro-
gress towards a European asylum and migra-
tion policy that could restore the necessary 
balance between pragmatism and funda-
mental values. Therefore, any “unravelling” 
of the reform package should be firmly 
resisted. 
Nonetheless, many questions remain 
unanswered. What are the guarantees that 
the planned preliminary asylum examina-
tions, processing facilities and returns are 
designed and executed in accordance with 
human rights laws? Once the legislative 
amendments have been adopted, what 
instruments would the Commission have 
to sanction member states that are not 
willing to implement them? How can it be 
ensured that the proposals announced for 
next year for reforming legal migration – 
which would be of paramount importance 
for reducing irregular migration and foster-
ing genuine partnerships with countries 
of origin and transit – are not pushed into 
the background? 
The intention underlying the Commis-
sion’s approach to build a bridge between 
the more migration-friendly states and 
the migration-sceptical states is to be wel-
comed. However, this will only be the case 
if the balance between restrictive and pro-
tection-oriented elements that the Commis-
sion is seeking is maintained in the upcom-
ing negotiations. This is the only way to 
prevent a one-sided focus on deterrence, 
which would undoubtedly be accompanied 
by further serious violations of human rights. 
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